Séminaire GREDEG : Nobuyuki HANAKI (Osaka University)

Publié le 23 juin 2022 Mis à jour le 23 juin 2022

le 28 juin 2022

14H00 - 15h30 Salle Picasso (et à distance sur Zoom)
GREDEG - Bâtiment 2 - Campus Azur du CNRS - 250 rue Albert Einstein - SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS

Lien Zoom
ID de réunion : 832 7811 9508
Code secret : 369865


Nobuyuki HANAKI (Osaka University)

Title: « An experimental Nash program »

Abstract: In this presentation, I will summarize a series of experiments that compare various mechanisms that implement Shapley value. Particular focus is given to a comparison between an offer based mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and a demand based mechanism proposed by Winter (1994, Winter). The results suggest that while the offer based H-MC results in higher frequency of the grand coalition formation and efficiency than Winter, if we focus on those groups that formed the grand coalition, Winter mechanism results in
allocation that are closer to the Shapley value. I complement results of these experiments on structured bargaining models with results of unstructured bargaining experiments to better understand them.

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Le 28 juin 2022 14:00 - 15:30