Séminaire GREDEG : Sudipta SARANGI (Department Head at Virginia Tech​)

Publié le 5 juin 2024 Mis à jour le 7 juin 2024

le 13 juin 2024


Title: Games Under Network Uncertainty

We consider an incomplete information network game in which agents only have partial information about the network’s architecture. They form beliefs about the rest of the network and play a linear-quadratic effort game to maximize interim payoffs. We establish the existence and uniqueness of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In equilibrium, agents use local knowledge of their direct and indirect connections to make inferences about the complementarity strength of their actions with other agents given by their updated beliefs regarding their walks in the network. Consequently, under incomplete information, besides network architecture, agent identity plays a crucial role in determining strategic behavior. Analytical characterizations are provided for equilibrium actions under uniform and core-periphery priors. The role of heterogenous network information among agents is also discussed.

Authors: Promit K. Chaudhuri, Matthew O. Jackson, Sudipta Sarangi and Hector Tzavellas

More about Sudipta Sarangi
Le 13 juin 2024 14:00 - 15:30