Publié le 30 mars 2026
–
Mis à jour le 30 mars 2026
Date(s)
le 9 avril 2026
GREDEG
TItle:
Centralized vs. Decentralized markets with Cash and Equity: Experimental Evidence
Abstract:
We investigate how market format and payment structure under asymmetric information affect seller revenues. Our environment varies (i) the market format between decentralized and centralized markets, and (ii) payment structure between equity and cash. Theory predicts that seller revenues are highest in centralized markets with equity payments, followed by decentralized equity markets, centralized cash markets, and decentralized cash markets. Our results provide partial support for these predictions. While centralized markets generally outperform decentralized formats, equity payments increase seller revenues in decentralized markets. We provide evidence that adverse selection in centralized equity markets helps explain this deviation from theoretical predictions.
More about Jean-Paul Rabanal
Centralized vs. Decentralized markets with Cash and Equity: Experimental Evidence
Abstract:
We investigate how market format and payment structure under asymmetric information affect seller revenues. Our environment varies (i) the market format between decentralized and centralized markets, and (ii) payment structure between equity and cash. Theory predicts that seller revenues are highest in centralized markets with equity payments, followed by decentralized equity markets, centralized cash markets, and decentralized cash markets. Our results provide partial support for these predictions. While centralized markets generally outperform decentralized formats, equity payments increase seller revenues in decentralized markets. We provide evidence that adverse selection in centralized equity markets helps explain this deviation from theoretical predictions.
More about Jean-Paul Rabanal
